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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF tn'AH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * STATE OF UTAH, ,.._ 
* Respondent,·· No. 
* vs 
- 7351 
* KENNETH JOE BARKER, • 
* Appellant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial 
District Court o~ the State of Utah, 
~ 
in and for Garf1e1d County~ 
Honorable .John L. Sevy, Jr. , Judge .. 
FILE DJ. VERNON ERICKSON. 
· · .·. ~~_.1 · Attorney foP Appellant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * STATE OF UTAH, 
* 
Respondent, 
* 
vs 
* KENNETH JOE BARKER, 
* 
Appellant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant in this action, 
Kenneth Joe Barker, was tried and 
convicted upon an information which 
charged him with the crime of carnal 
knowledge or one Rosaleen Cope, a 
female over the age or 13 years and 
under the age of 18 years, she being 
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of the age of 17 years, and an 
unma~ried female not the wife of 
said Kenneth Joe Barker. 
The testimony of the prosecutrix 
at the trial of this action was 
substantially as follows: That she 
was of the age or 17 years and 5 
months on April 18, 19481 at which 
time she was residing with he·r parents 
1n Tropic, Utah, that she was 
unmarried at said time and knew the 
defendant, Kenneth Joe Barker some-
what casually in April, 1948. That 
ehe lmew he was a married man at said 
time. That on the 18th day or April, 
1948 at 7:30p.m., Allan Clark, Wade 
Cheynoweth and Joe, (the defendant) 
came up to her home in a jeep and Allan 
as·ked her if she would like to go to 
the show with him. She accepted the 
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invitation but when they arrived at 
the theater Wade left the •ar, and the 
others decided torgo to Cannonville 
and get a girl for Joe (the defendant). 
At Cannonville while they were waiting 
for Joe, Allan got fresh with her and 
they quarreled so that when the 
defendant came back to the jeep she 
got in the back seat and the defendant 
and Allan got in the front seat. The, 
were going to drive to Henrieville to 
get a girl for the defendant, but on 
the way the defendant got in the back 
seat with the prosecutrix and started 
getting fresh with her. She told 
Allan to stop the jeep that she was 
getting out and walking back to 
Cannonville which he did and the 
prosecutrix got out and started walk-
ing. The defendant got out too and 
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began overtaking her, grabbed hold ot 
her leg and threw her to the ground. 
She asked Allan to help her·;)but he 
declined, and then the defendant took 
her down in a wash and an act of sexual. 
intercourse took place, after which 
the prosecutrix starteq crying, the 
defendant helped her to her feet and 
out or the ... wash .. They went back to 
the jeep, and the boys took her home 
at about 11 o'clock p.m. She told her 
parents what had happened and her 
Mother called the Sheriff and later 
on that night her mother, the 
prosecutrix, the defendant and 
Milford Ahlstrom went to Panguitch 
to consult the Sheriff, at his r~quest. 
(T. pages 5 to 29) 
Allan Clark, a witness for the 
State, testified that after Rosaleen 
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and the defendant lett the jeep he 
drove down the road about a quarter ct 
a mile and turned around and drove 
slowly back to the point where they 
had left the jeep. They were beside 
the road and it appeared to him that 
they were having an act ot intercourse. 
In his opinion it was about 9 o'clock 
p .. m. and a clear moonlight night, so 
he went up the road about 50 yards 
and stopped. He saw Rosaleen crawl 
through a renee and run through the 
brush. He hollered to her to come 
and get in the jeep but she answered 
that she couldn't, he wouldn't let 
her. Up to this point he hadn't 
heard Rosaleen call tor any help. 
He went back to the jeep, waited for 
quite a while and went back aown and 
they were gone, so he came back to the 
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jeep and drove down in there and 
shined his lights and hollered, but 
not finding them, he went back to 
Tropic where Wade Cheynoweth was 
attending the show and picked him up 
and they came back down and hollered 
some more and then they hiked dom1. 
there and found Joe and Rosaleen 
coming back. Neither the prosecutrix 
or the defendant said anything to the 
witness Clark as to what had gone on 
while they were down there. In his 
judgment it was then about 10:30 
p.m. The four of them got back in 
the jeep and took Rosaleen home, he 
and Cheynoweth sitting in the front 
seat and Joe and Rosaleen in the 
back. They were not quarreling on 
the way home and Joe got out and 
walked in to the door of her home 
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with her. The witness also stated 
that when Rosaleen and Joe were in the 
back seat of the jeep prior to the 
incident, that there was no scuffling 
and that they got along good as far 
as he knew, and that when he saw them 
having what looked to him like an 
act of sexual intercourse they were 
quiet, not struggling. (T. pages 29 
to 40) 
The mother of the prosecutrix, 
Mrs. Marsha Cope was called as a 
witness and testified upon direct 
examination that her daughter came 
home about 11 p.m. and she got up from 
her bed and after asking her daughter 
if she was back from the show, or had 
been in a wreck> the prosecutrix 
narrated to her mother what had taken 
place that evening. This testimony 
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was objected to by the detee4ant•a 
attorney as hearsay evidence, but 
was admitted over the objection ot 
the defense. (T. pages -1 to 46) 
There were no witnesses in 
behalf ot the defendant and the 
defendant himself did not testify~ 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The statement or errors upon 
which the Appellant relies tor a 
reversal or the judgment or the Court 
below, are as follows: 
1. The Court committed a 
reversible error in admitting h&arsay 
evidence over the objection ot eounael 
tor the defendant. 
2. The Court erred in denying ~"' 
the defendant's MOtion for New Trial 
in this action tor the reason that the 
Court erred in the.decision ot a 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
question or law arising during the 
course of the trial, prejudicial to 
the substantial rights or the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
The Court erred in admitting 
hearsay evidence over the objection 
of counsel. 
The testimony to which the defense 
objected was that of the mother of the 
prosecutrix, Mrs. Marsha Cope as set 
forth on Transcript pages 40 to 46. 
This testimony under direct examinatiOn 
is in part as follows: 
"Q I want you now to. tell the 
Court and the jury, Mrs. Cope, 
the matters and things--! 
will wi·thdraw that for a 
moment--Do you recall about 
the~time of night it was when 
your daughter returned home 
on the evening of April 18, 
1948? 
A Yes, sir, I looked at the 
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clock and timed it especially, 
and it was either a very few 
minutes to 11 or a very few 
after, but it was approxi• 
mately 11 o'clock. 
~ Now, I want you to tell the 
Court and the jury the matters 
and things that were then 
revealed to~~ou by your 
daughter and I want you to 
tell them any observations 
you made of clothing or the 
appearance of your daughter, 
or matters or that sort. Will 
you~··.kindly tell the jury those 
things please? 
A When Rosaleen came in, she 
called, "Mother", as soon as 
she came in and I said "You 
got back from the show, have 
you?" and she said, "Come here, 
I want to talk to you," and 
I said, "Well, Dad has just 
got to resting.rr By the way, 
her father was bedfast at the 
time. 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: Just 
a moment,. I object to that as 
incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial. 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: What 
do you mean, the question? 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: First 
it is hearsay. The defendant 
10 
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wasn't present. To repeat that 
conversation you would violate 
the rule or hearsay entirely. 
She can go so far as say, "Mother 
I am raped." 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: We 
are not talking about rape at all. 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: Well, 
she might as well say rape. 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: You 
like to get that word 11rape" in 
here. This is our position with 
reference to that testimony, 
that the things that are revealed 
within a close proximity of their 
happening on the part of a minor 
child are material as coming in 
under the rule of res gestae 
which is, of cotwse, an exception 
to the hearsay rule. If 1t were 
not for that, I wouldn't ask that 
this testimony be admitted, but a 
child telling a parent the thin~ 
that just went on prior to the 
child's coming on the scene are 
res gestae and the evidence is 
material under that one exc~ptian 
to the hearsay rule. 
By Mr. ·J. Vernon Erickson: That· 
isn•t, Your Honor, a true state~ 
ment of the law, because if that 
were the case, when she came to 
the jeep that would have been the 
time to bring out res gestae. 
This is purely hearsay. 
11 
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By the Court: Objection overruled 4444WWWWWW4U~ 
Bf Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: I 
respectfully except, Your Honor. 
Q Tell us now, Mrs. Cope, the 
things revealed to you by your 
daughter at about 11 p.m. on the 
evening of April 18, 1948 at your 
home please. 
A She said~ "But mother, I need 
you now, ' so I got up at once 
and went into the room where 
she was and the minute I saw 
her I thought that there had 
been a wreck and I said, "Oh 
my heavens, Rosaleen, you have 
been in a wreck." 
Q You have been in what? 
A In a wreck. 
Q Wreck. 
A And she said, "Mother, I 
didn't go to the show. We 
went down to Cannonville, " ani 
she said, "and Allan got fresh 
with me and we had a quarrel," 
and went on and said that Joe 
got in the back with her and 
she said, "I told him~to stop, 
so I could get out and go 
home." 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: May I 
interrupt just a minute, Your 
12 
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Honor, please. I would like to 
make an objection to that. Now 
that conversation could not fall 
within that rule. 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: I have 
argued that matter once before, 
beforae this Court. Exclamations 
disclosed by a child, a minor c~· 
child, within a reasonable time 
after an alleged offense are 
material. 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: A girl 
seventeen and a half years of 
age? 
By the Court: Objection overruled. 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: May ·• 
we have an exception? 
Q Tell us~ Mrs. Cope, what else 
went on. 
A And she said, "Allan stopped 
the car," that she got out arrl 
she said, "I started going 
toward Cannonville as fast as 
r· could, " and she said, "I 
heard something behind me, and 
he grabbed me and threw me on 
the ground, and instead or_ 
helping me up, he took me down 
through the fields!)" and she just said, "There he committed 
the crime," and 
Q Incidentally, did she tell you 
what crime he eommitted? -
13 
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A Yes~ she did. 
Q What was that? 
A She told me they had had 
intercourse. 1 
Q Tell me, Mrs. Cope, did you 
examine the clothing that 
Rosaleen was wearing that 
evening? 
A No, not at that time, I 
didn't. Her father said, 
rrYou go right down to the 
Sheriff and get him to get 
Joe Barker and put him under 
arrest right now," and that's 
what I did, and, 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: May I 
have an objection to that? 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: You 
can object to it if you want to. 
By Mr. J. Vernon Erickson: That 
is most vicious. 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: Now 
listen, I don't want you to say, 
"most vicious." If you want to· 
argue that matter, we will excuse 
the jury. 
(Colloquy between counsel) 
By the Court: Just a minute, tl'at 
14 
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part relating to the conversation 
with her husband may go out. 
By Mr. Ferdinand Erickson: I 
don't want that in the record, it 
clutters the record. It has no 
probative value. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
The admission of the fore-
going testimony, Appellant contends, 
was a violation of the rules of 
evidence and was very prejudicial to 
him with the Jury. Although the record 
does not disclose the emotional atti-
tude or the witness during this 
examination, she wept at times, and 
appellant contends that the conver-
sations between mother and daughter 
as related by the mother, were highly 
prejudicial to him and that the Jury 
could not help but be swayed by such 
testimony, and that such conversations 
made not in the presence of the 
15 
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defendant, did not come under the rule 
of res gestae but were purely hearsay 
and not admissible~ 
Bouviers Law Dictionary defines 
Res Gestae as follows: 
"Those circumstances which are 
theoautomatic and undesigned 
incidents of a particular 
litigated act, and which are 
admissible in evidence when 
illustrative of such act. 
Whart. Ev. 96 Cal. 125. 
Events speaking for themselves 
through the instructive words 
and acts of participants, not the 
words and acts of participants 
when narrating the events. 18 
Colo. 170." 
It is a well settled rule that jn 
order for a declaration to be admiss-
ible as part of the res gestae, it 
must be the spontaneous utterance of 
the mind while under the influence of 
the transaction or event, the test 
being whether the declaration was the 
facts talking through the party, or 
16 
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the party talking about the facts. 
In the case of Erickson et al v. 
Edward Rutledge Timber Co., an Idaho 
case reported in 191 Pacific, page 212, 
it was held that the lower court 
committed no error in granting a 
motion for a new trial upon the 
ground that certain evidence, which 
had been admitted as part of the res 
gestae, was not properly admitted 
but was hearsay. In that case 
testimony of the daughter relating 
the declarations of her father to 
her of inj~ries received by him some 
two hours after such injuries were 
.received, was admitted by the trial 
court as part of the res gestae but 
a motion for new trial was granted 
because such testimony had been 
admitted. The father was sui'fering 
17 
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great pain at the time or the 
declarations and died later. 
The Court in this case held: 
"The controlling test is, not 
whether the statement made is 
Probably true, but whether it 
was made at a time when the 
dedlarant was in such a calm, 
reflective, and deliberate 
state of mind as to enable him 
to fabricate a statement, if he 
chose, thereby constituting the 
statement a.narrative of a past 
transaction. Where the circum-
stances, as 1n this case, show 
that the statement was made while 
the declarant was in such a state 
of mind, it is immaterial wheth~ 
what he said is true or false. 
In either event it is hearsay and 
is not admissible as part of the 
res gestae, and the error in 
admitting it is regarded as 
prejudicial. As was said by the 
Court of Appeals of New York: 
'Whatever we may consider to have 
been the sufficiency of the other 
evidence, we could, and should, 
not assume that a declaration, 
made under such circumstances, .. ,: 
may not.-have had its effect upcn 
the jurors• minds.' Greener v. 
General Electric Co. 209 N.Y. 
135, 137, 102 N.E. 527, 528 (46 
L.R.A. {N.S.) 975); National 
18 
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Masonic Ace. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 
Fed. 774, 20 C.C.A. 3." 
In order tor statements to be 
admitted as part or the res gestae, 
it must oe clearly shown that such 
statements must be so spontaneous as 
to leave no suspicion that the 
ded~arant was in a deliberate or 
reflective state of mind, or had had 
time to reflect or deliberate. The 
prosecutrix in this case had had ample 
time for deliberation and reflection. 
According to the testimony of the 
.witness, Clark, it was about 9 p.m. 
when the prosecutrix and the defendant 
left the jeep, and it was about 10:30 
p.m. when they got back in the jeep. 
The prosecutrix made no statements 
then to the other boys in the jeep or 
on the way home, but got in the back 
seat with the defendant. She did ~ot 
19 
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quarrel with the defendant on the way 
home, and upon arriving home allowed 
him to accompany her to her gate or 
door. The evidence shows she acted 
calmly and deliberately. She arrived 
home at about 11 p.m. Her conversations 
to her mother after going in the hous~ 
as related by her mother and as set 
forth herein, were in a long drawn out 
narrative form. She called her mother 
and said she wanted to talk with her 
whereupon her mother asked her if &he 
had got back from the·show and she 
replied she did not go to the show and 
her mother then asked her if she had 
been in a wreck, and she said no, that 
Allan had got fresh with her and that 
she then got in the back seat of the 
jeep and that Joe got in the back seat 
with her, and in a narrative and 
20 
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detailed manner related the events or.· 
the evening. Appellant contends that 
t 
under these circumstances these state-
menta could not be part of the res 
gestae, and that such evidence was 
merely hearsay. 
In the case of Spears vs. State, 
an Oklahoma case reported in 207 Pac. 
2nd, 363, the Court held: 
"The admission of hearsay evid-
ence over the objection of 
defendant which evidence pro-
bably contributed to a verdict 
of guilty constitutes a revers-
ible error." 
Appellant contends that in the case 
at bar, the testimony of the daughter's 
conversations to the Mother, related 
by the mother, was too glaring a 
violation of the rules of evidence to 
be termed harmless, for the Jury were 
certainly influenced and swayed by the 
21 
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tearful testimony of the Mother relat -
ing her daughter's statements, and 
it had an effect upon them in arriv-
ing at their verdict of guilty. 
Point 2. 
The Court erred in denying the 
defendant's motion for new trial for 
the reason that the Court erred in 
the decision of a question of law 
arising during the course of the trial, 
prejudicial to the substantial rights 
of the defendant. 
The Court in overruling defendan~~ 
motion for new trial said: 
"I am a little in doubt whether 
the motion should be considered 
or not, but I will definitely 
rule that the motion for new trial 
is overruled and denied. The 
Court heard the evidence and I feel 
that it does come within the 
rule of res gestae and was admis-
sible." T. page 54. 
22 
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Appellant contends that the 
crourt committed a reversible error 
in admitting the testimony of the 
prosecutrix' mother, that such 
testimony was not admissible under 
the rule of res gestae, was hearsay 
evidence, and served only to 
prejudice the defendant's rights 
with the jury, and that therefore 
the defendant's Motion for New Trial 
should have been granted upon such 
ground. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Appellant 
submits that the Court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial 
court bec2use of the errors committed 
1n admitting hearsay testimony which 
was prejudicial to the defendant, over 
the objection of counsel, because such 
23 
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. 
testimony was inadmissible under the 
law and served only to prejudice the 
jury against the defendant~ and fur-
ther that the Court should have sustain-
ed the defendant's Motion for New 
Trial upon such ground. 
Respectfully submitted,. 
J.VERNON ERICKSON. 
Attorney for Appellant, 
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